Effects of cumpulsory voting on visible minority representation by Schwartz, Belinda
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Political Science CAS: Political Science: Undergraduate Honors Theses
2015-05-11
Effects of cumpulsory voting on
visible minority representation
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11222
Boston University
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of Compulsory Voting on Visible Minority Representation 
 
by Belinda Schwartz 
 
April 25, 2015 
  
1 
 
The typical image of a European is simple - white and Christian.  It has been that 
way for centuries.  However, the face of Europe is changing. The foreign-born 
population of the European Union (EU) is growing, rising to 7% of the total EU 
population in 2013, as compared to 6% in 2011.  As of 2014, Turkey, Morocco, China, 
and India are the top four countries contributing non-EU resident immigrants to the EU. 
Many other contributing countries are from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (European 
Commission). This is an indicator that a large influx of immigrants to the EU don’t fit the 
stereotype of a “European.” Europe has attracted immigrants for hundreds of years, but 
only in the last 60 or so have researchers begun to think about the political 
representation of these immigrants, many of whom eventually become citizens.  In 
some countries, these minorities, who are visibly different than the majority population 
of their country of residence, find obstacles to proportional representation. 
 History shows us that those who look different or have different customs 
sometimes face discrimination.  It is arguable that discrimination is less harsh and 
obvious now, but there are still subtle ways to discriminate. Sometimes, the 
discrimination is top-down – a government might have mechanisms in place that make it 
more difficult for a minority to get elected, such as laws that don’t allow campaign flyers 
in non-national languages.  Other times, discrimination is bottom-up – when people 
don’t vote for a member of a minority because they are visibly different. Still, other times 
minorities are disadvantaged because they are immigrants or the children of 
immigrants, and might not have the same resources or knowledge of the system that 
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members of the long-established majority may have1.  Whatever the reason, visible 
minorities often achieve little or no representation (Bird, “Visible Minorities” 425).   
Governments should fight against this and implement methods to counterbalance 
discrimination against visible minority candidates.  It is important that visible minorities 
have representatives in government.  A democracy is idealized as a system where 
every member of the community has a say.  In a representative democracy, people 
elect a person to represent them and present their point of view during decision-making 
processes.  Can a country really be called a democracy if there isn’t descriptive 
representation? I argue not, because not making it possible for all groups to have a 
voice is a form of oppression. As George Wharton Pepper said, “What you want is to 
get a reflection of the general opinion of the nation” (qtd. in Pitkin).  Some might claim 
that it does not matter if minorities are represented in a parliament, because their 
representation will be too small to really affect anything.   As Pitkin argues, however, 
enacting legislation is not the only function of a representative. Legislative members 
also serve as watchdogs.  Minorities need to have members representing them in these 
legislative bodies so that their voice is at least heard during decision-making processes 
(63-64).   As Professor Bird from McMaster University says: “A parliament should be a 
microcosm of a nation” (“Women and Ethnic Minorities” 2). 
Many researchers have tried to discover which political systems enhance visible 
minority representation, and why.  One thing that has not been discussed is the impact 
of compulsory voting on minority representation.  When people immigrate to a new 
country, they often feel disenfranchised from political processes, even after achieving 
the right to vote. For this reason, many immigrants may not choose to vote or be active 
                                                
1 This is an issue that faces all immigrants and children of immigrants, not just visible minorities.  
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in politics.  Research has shown that minorities tend to support each other at the polls, 
engaging in “bloc” voting (Shella). In theory, a minority group could band together in 
support for one or more candidates and influence their election. By forcing minority 
members to vote, do compulsory voting laws result in higher representation of 
minorities?  The hypothesis for this study is that they do, because they require minority 
citizens to vote, even if they feel disconnected from politics. I expect that visible minority 
representation will be lower in countries without compulsory voting laws because 
immigrants who feel disenfranchised will not be required to vote and therefore there will 
be less support for minority candidates. My results show that compulsory voting does 
have a positive effect on visible minority representation overall, but the difference is very 
small.  It is likely that other factors come into play. 
Many researchers claim the type of electoral system to be the largest deciding 
factor of minority representation. When research on the topic had just begun, it was first 
believed that a proportional electoral system was the most beneficial.  In a proportional 
electoral system, seats are allocated according to the proportion of votes that a party or 
candidate gets. Several representatives are elected per constituency. This is supposed 
to give smaller parties more of a chance of winning seats, for several reasons (Shella).  
As mentioned above, some visible minorities face discrimination because they look 
different than the majority.  In a proportional voting system, people essentially vote for 
the party - thus removing emphasis from the candidate. In some cases, the party lists 
are closed, so that voters do not even really know the individuals they are electing. So, 
under a proportional system, especially a closed-list one, visible minority candidates are 
less likely to face discrimination in the election. 
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Recently, though, scholars and researchers have begun to realize that 
majoritarian systems might be more beneficial for minorities that are concentrated in 
one or more constituencies (Bird; Bloemraad; Stoychev; Shella).  In a majoritarian 
system, only one member is elected per constituency, and the winner is determined by 
which one gets more than 50% of the vote.  There is no “closed list” option - everyone 
knows who is running, and only one is chosen. So, a lot more emphasis is put on the 
candidate.  If, say, a Bangladeshi candidate were to stand in a constituency that is 50% 
or more Bangladeshi, they would have a high chance of being elected (assuming they 
had the full support of the Bangladeshi community)2.  Several recent papers on minority 
representation seem to agree that the majoritarian system would be preferable in all 
cases where the minority is concentrated in a particular constituency.  
Some researchers claim that it’s the nuances of the system that matter more 
than the system itself (such as open versus closed list, preference voting, or the number 
of representatives per constituency) (Bird, “Visible Minorities”; Shella; Bloemraad).  Bird 
believes the higher the number of representatives per constituency, the better the 
chance of a minority member being offered on the ticket.  According to this logic, it could 
be argued that having a closed-list system would be preferable, because the party 
would choose who is elected, and not the voters.  However, I would argue that a closed-
list could also produce a negative effect.  First because the party might not feel 
obligated to nominate a visible minority candidate, and second because this would 
mean that the visible minority community would not be able to support visible minority 
candidates (since they would not know who was running). Bird also believes that 
                                                
2 .  There is evidence that minorities tend to vote for fellow minorities. See Shella. 
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allowing preferential and cumulative voting would improve visible minority 
representation. 
Reserved seats in the parliament are another point of examination, as they 
guarantee a minority some representation.  However, some political scientists claim that 
reserved seats can be counterproductive, and that they are not necessary to achieve 
proportional representation. The Australian Parliament of New South Wales published a 
document containing arguments for and against having a reserved seat for aboriginals. 
Arguments against included “may be seen as undemocratic,” that it wouldn’t really 
afford those in the seats any real power, and that it might make people resentful 
towards aboriginals (49-54). Reserved seats might also take away motivation from 
parties to nominate minority candidates, using the reserved seats as an excuse for not 
putting more minority candidates on the ticket.  Stoychev agrees that reserved seats for 
minorities have their benefits and their drawbacks. On the one hand, they symbolize an 
extended hand from the government to the minority groups who receive the reserved 
seats. But on the other hand, often only some minorities receive the seats while others 
do not (9). 
Other researchers have claimed that having party quotas would help aid in visible 
ethnic minority representation. A quota would require that a certain number or 
percentage of standing candidates or a percentage of the legislature be from a visible 
minority.  Obviously, implementing a quota for the actual body of parliament would be 
more effective than requiring a percentage of candidates for each party to be part of a 
visible minority. It has been implemented on the national level so far to further 
representation of women, but not for visible minorities. However, as of now, at least two 
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parties have voluntarily implemented ethnic minority quotas - the Ontario New 
Democratic Party in Canada and the Welsh Labour Party in the UK (Bird, “Women and 
Ethnic Minorities”).  
Still others claim that the size of the minority is an important factor (Bird, “Women 
and Ethnic Minorities”).  Because visible minorities tend to vote in blocs, having a 
sizeable bloc will better ensure that the candidate they want gets elected.   It needs to 
be large enough that their voting power matters, and this changes for every minority in 
every country. 
This is heavily tied in with other factors. Voting in a bloc or having your own 
political party is more likely to result in representation (Bird, Stoychev).  Stoychev 
argues that minority groups with cohesive political parties are more likely to have better 
representation, but I would say this is only true if the electoral system is in favor of the 
minority’s geographical spread, as well as the size of the majority. You can have all 
members of a minority vote for a candidate, but if the minority is only 0.01% of the 
population, it is unlikely that they win. 
Most of these studies have called for the same thing - more and better cross-
country comparisons.  The lack of these types of comparisons is mostly due to the lack 
of information on minorities available in many countries.  Cross-country comparisons 
also require a lot of time, and may be difficult for researchers who do not speak different 
languages (although current technology, like Google Translate, has made this a smaller 
issue). When you study an issue across several cases, different patterns start to 
emerge.  You can examine whether one country’s case is unique, or if its situation is 
similar to others.  One country might have low visible minority representation, but with 
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cross-country comparison you can better determine whether this is just the country’s 
issue, or a global issue. I chose to include several different cases in my study so that I 
could examine the visible minority representation patterns of countries with compulsory 
voting against countries without compulsory voting. 
 Four nations in this study employ compulsory voting - Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
and Greece.  The representation of the visible minorities in their countries will be 
compared with other countries in the EU that do not have compulsory voting. 
Furthermore, since the countries all employ compulsory voting in different ways, the 
effect of their variation will be examined as well. 
For the purposes of this study, “visible minority” will be defined as a group that 
takes up a small percentage of the country’s entire population, and which is visibly 
distinctive (either by appearance or name) from the majority of the population.  This is 
different from non-visible minorities because they, at least members of the second 
generation, can mask their origins if they choose to do so - they will most likely be able 
to speak the language fluently, with no accent, and be more adapted to the country and 
the way it runs. Visible minorities cannot mask their origins, and thus could be at risk of 
facing discrimination as well as the difficulties of integration which non-visible immigrant 
minorities may face, which, as discussed on the first page, can also hinder visible 
minorities from being elected 
Case Selection 
Most literature regarding representation of minorities has called for more cross-
country comparison, so a lot of effort was put into collecting the data to compare across 
countries. For several reasons, I chose to focus my study primarily on countries in the 
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European Union. The European Parliament sets immigration rules that every member 
state must follow - this include policies meant to help immigrants assimilate, rules on 
admissions of immigrants, rules on the issuance of visas, and more (European 
Commission, “Immigration in the EU”).  There are two reasons why this would make the 
EU a good area to study for minority representation research.  The first is that all 
countries in the EU are held to a certain standard regarding immigration, democracy, 
and human rights.  This provides an automatic control for extraneous factors.  The 
second reason is that, as evident by the recent rise of anti-immigration parties in 
Europe3, immigration is currently a hot topic.  This made me hopeful that EU countries 
would be fertile ground for researching the arrival of visible minorities and how they fare 
politically in their new arenas. 
There are 27 countries in the European Union. Ideally, each of the member 
states would have provided demographic data on the race of all its citizens at the time 
of the last election.  This would have been coupled with racial and origin information for 
every current member of Parliament in those countries. Therefore, we would be able to 
know how many visible minority members were present in each country at the time of 
the last election, and exactly how many visible minority members were elected. None of 
the EU member states provided such explicit details4. The lack of information is 
probably a large part of the reason why so little cross-country comparison has been 
done surrounding minority representation. However, previous studies on minority 
representation provided guidelines for how to conduct a study without the racial 
information. 
                                                
3 Some examples are the UK’s United Kingdom Independence Party and the Dutch Party for Freedom. 
 
4 In fact, Brazil was the only country in this study to provide information about race. 
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 In most studies done on minority representation, demographic information was 
collected from censuses, which more often than not include not only citizens, but 
residents as well (who cannot vote in national elections). I therefore decided to do the 
same. Countries that had no demographic information available, including information 
on visible minorities, were thus cut out of the study. 
As mentioned earlier, the existing literature on minority representation claims that 
the electoral system is one of the biggest influencers of minority representation. In order 
to control for electoral system influence, I decided that all countries in the study should 
have the same electoral system.  Because my main focus is to examine the effect of 
compulsory voting laws, I decided that all countries in the study should have 
Proportional electoral systems to match the systems of the Parliaments of the two 
countries with compulsory voting laws - Greece and Belgium5. Eliminating all EU 
countries whose parliaments do not use proportional electoral systems left five (besides 
Belgium and Greece): Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. 
 In order to add more balance to the study between countries with compulsory 
voting laws and those without, Brazil and Australia were added to the study.  Just like all 
the countries in the European Union, Brazil and Australia have a “free” ranking from the 
Freedom House, which ensures they reach a certain level of democracy and human 
rights (much like the countries in the EU must have to be part of the EU).  They also 
                                                
5 Luxembourg is the third country in the EU to have compulsory voting laws, and its Chambre de Députés 
also uses a proportional system.  However,  it is not included in this study because no demographic 
information on visible minorities was available. Cyprus also has mandatory voting, but I chose not to 
include its House of Representatives  in the study because of the way members are chosen - the Greek 
community in Cyprus gets to elect 56 of the seats, while the Turkish community in Cyprus gets to elect 24 
of the seats.None of the other Parliaments have reserved seats for minorities. Furthermore, the Turkish 
community has not elected representatives to those seats since 1963, leaving them empty. This is a 
unique situation which might skew results, so I chose not to include it. 
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both have a visible minority presence in the population  - Asians and aboriginals in 
Australia; blacks, aboriginals, and Asians in Brazil.  
For this study, I am only examining parliaments elected within a proportional 
electoral system6. Therefore, some legislative houses had to be cut from the study. 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Slovakia are unicameral, and their legislative houses 
are elected via a proportional system.  Australia and Brazil are bicameral, but while both 
houses in each country are directly elected, only one house in each country in is elected 
with a proportional system. Thus, the Australian Senate was included, but not its House 
of Representatives.  The Brazilian Cámara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies) was 
included, but the Senado Federal (Federal Senate) was not.  It was also important that 
all the houses have directly elected members, because the study is considering the 
effects that compulsory voting has visible minority representation. Compulsory voting 
laws would not directly affect a legislature that is not elected directly.  Therefore, 
indirectly elected legislatures were not included in the study. Austria, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands are bicameral, and in each case only the directly elected body was 
considered. Thus, the Nationalrat (National Council) of Austria, but not its Bundesrat 
(Federal Council), was included. The Chambre de Représentants (House of 
Representatives) of Belgium, but not its Senát (Senate). The Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal (House of Representatives) of the Netherlands, but not its Eerste 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal (Senate).  
None of these parliaments employ quotas for the minority groups that are being 
examined.  All cases use an open-list proportional electoral system, with three 
                                                
6 All information about parliamentary houses and electoral systems for each country is from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union Website http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp 
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exceptions. Austria and Slovakia use a closed-list system, while the Australian Senate 
uses the Single-Transferable Vote proportional system.  
Compulsory Voting Laws 
 Compulsory voting laws, or some form of them, are currently implemented in 22 
countries around the world.  More than half of these countries are located in South 
America (Santhanam). Not all compulsory voting laws are implemented or enforced the 
same way. A report published by the Electoral Commission in 2006 claims that some of 
these countries really have “compulsory attendance,” because citizens are not actually 
required to vote, just to show up to the voting booth. In fact, the report paraphrases the 
findings of Researchers Jonathan Louth and Lisa Hill, who claim that Australia and 
Belgium are two of the only four democratic countries that consistently enforce 
compulsory voting laws7(9). However, whether it is actually compulsory voting or just 
attendance, the report claims that compulsory voting laws result in higher turnout rates 
and “reduces the variation in turnout rates among different groups” (33).  This is 
important because it means that compulsory voting can increase the voter turnout of 
visible minorities, which I hypothesize would, in turn, increase visible minority 
representation. 
  Four countries included in this study have some sort of compulsory voting law: 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, and Greece. Each employs compulsory voting in different 
ways, and each enforces these rules to different degrees. 
 In Belgium, failure to vote will make it harder for you to get a government job, and 
you might receive a small fine.  If you don’t vote four years in a row, you won’t be 
allowed to vote for the next ten years (Frankal).  I consider Belgium to have the strictest 
                                                
7 The other two are Luxembourg and Cyprus 
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system of compulsory voting laws in this study, for its consequences and the fact that all 
citizens must vote regardless of age. 
 Brazil’s case is similar. Brazilians who fail to vote will have to pay a fine equal to 
a small percentage of the minimum wage in the region.  Not only will you find it difficult 
to get a government job if you don’t vote, but you also might be barred from certain 
government services – like getting a passport or a loan (Electoral Commission).  
Therese rules are strictly enforced.  Illiterates and those over 70 years old are not 
required to vote (IDEA, “Compulsory Voting”).    
In Greece, the the compulsory voting law is essentially just on paper.  The law 
has not been repealed, but since 2000, it is no longer legal to penalize anyone for not 
voting (“Compulsory”).  This is still included in the study because even a non-enforced 
law might still have an effect on citizens.  It could especially have an affect on 
naturalized citizens, who must take an oath stating they will uphold Greece’s laws and 
“fulfill conscientiously [his or her] duties as a Greek citizen” (U.S. Embassy). 
Australia does not require citizens to actually vote, but it does require them to 
sign an attendance sheet at the polling booth. Failure to sign will result in a fine. Failure 
to pay the fine can result in jail (Frankal).  Australia strictly enforces these rules. 
According to the Electoral Commission Report, Australia is the only country that 
implemented a compulsory voting system as a way to improve voter turnouts.  This 
means, at the very least, that Australia is concerned with having more representative 
legislative body. 
 
Data collection 
13 
Finding and collecting the demographic and representative data was a large part 
of this project.  In order to be able to do this study, data was collected from a wide range 
of sources. 
The first step in collecting data was to search for demographic information.  This 
was first collected from the CIA World Factbook.  Then countries were checked for 
online census databases, and if the data was more up-to-date than the CIA World 
Factbook, the database information was used instead.  However, for consistency, the 
minorities mentioned for a specific country in the data from the CIA World Factbook was 
used to pick which minorities should be looked up in the database of that country.  This 
was helpful, but also limiting – sometimes, the CIA World Factbook data included some 
minorities, but did not include other, larger minorities8.  If neither the CIA World 
Factbook nor the country’s statistical database (if any) provided usable information, then 
I searched for academic papers or reputable news sources containing demographic 
information. 
Data on visible minority representatives in the relevant legislative bodies were 
collected in several ways as well. Each country provided a website that provided short 
biographies for each member of the legislature.  Every member was examined for 
visibility, by appearance and by name9. Some websites, like the Austrian Nationalrat, 
gave the place of birth for each representative.  This was used to confirm the foreign 
identity of some members who were visibly a part of the minority.  However, you can still 
be part of a visible minority if you were born in the country that you currently reside in, 
                                                
8 Netherlands, as you will see, is an example of this. 
9 Sometimes, this lead to finding a member who was part of a visible minority that had not been 
mentioned by the CIA World Factbook or academic papers.  If the minority’s percentage of the population 
could be found (like in the case of Afghans in the Netherlands), than they were included in the study.  If it 
could not be found, the member and his or her minority group were not included. 
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and not all websites provided the place of birth.  Therefore, reliable newspaper articles 
and posts from professional websites were used to verify the foreign background for 
other members. If a member looked or had a name that sounded like they could be part 
of a visible minority, but no supporting evidence was found of their foreign background, 
then they were not included in the study. 
The ways in which data were collected for each country are discussed below. 
 
Australia 
The CIA World Factbook provided Demographic information for Australia, naming 
Asians and Aboriginals as the visible minorities. However, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) had data that was more up-to-date.  Therefore, statistics were drawn 
from it instead of the Factbook.  Information was taken from the 2011 Census “Cultural 
and Language Diversity” Database. Census respondents were allowed to fill in two 
types of Ancestry.  I followed a specific procedure to determine the percentage of 
Asians in the population.  The number of respondents who had claimed Asian ancestry 
as their first choice was added to the number of respondents who claimed it as their 
second choice. It was then possible, using the tools provided by the website, to find out 
the number of people who had claimed Asian ancestry for both choices.  This number 
was subtracted to avoid overlap.  The same was done for Aboriginal/Torres Strait 
Islander ancestry.  Then, the percentages for Asian population and Aboriginal/Torres 
Strait Islander population were determined using the total population for 2011. It was 
thus calculated that 10.92% of the Australian population is Asian, while 0.64% of the 
population is Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander (“TableBuilder”).  However, the ABS had 
released a press statement in 2011 stating that the Aboriginal/Torres Strait population 
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was 3% of the total population (“Estimates”).  Because of the discrepancy, analysis will 
have to be done using both numbers.  One indigenous member was found in the 
Senate, her background being confirmed by several newspaper articles (“Senator”, 
Hodgson). This equals to 1.32% of the Senate, which exceeds proportionality according 
to my calculations but not according to the press release. Another article written in The 
Age claims there are only 4 Asian members of the Australian Parliament (Fung). The 
article named two members by name, both of which were confirmed to be in the Senate 
(“Senator Lisa,” “Senator Penny”). The other two were found because they listed Asian 
countries as their place of birth on their parliamentary website biographies.  Only one of 
those two is in the Senate (“Senator Zhenya”). Three Asian members make up about 
3.95% of the Senate. This is not proportionate to the population. Voter turnout was 
93.23% (IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Austria 
The CIA World Factbook website provided demographic data for Austria from its 
2001 census.  Austrians are 91.1% of the population, former Yugoslavs 4% (includes 
Croatians, Slovenes, Serbs, and Bosniaks), Turks 1.6%, German 0.9%, and other or 
unspecified 2.4%.  Turks are the visible minority. Austria has two legislative houses, but 
only one, the Nationalrat (National Council) is directly elected. There are 183 members, 
elected via a proportional system with closed party lists. There are no reserved seats or 
quotas for ethnicities (IPU Parline). Turkish members of the Nationalrat were identified 
by going through the profiles of every member listed on the official website (Austria).  
Those that identified Turkey as their place of birth were counted.  Further research was 
done on members who were born in Austria but had names suggesting Muslim 
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ethnicity, however, no proof was found that any of them had Turkish origins. One 
member was found to have Moroccan ancestry (Anzeige), but because Moroccans were 
not included in the demographic information, and no definitive information on 
Moroccans in Austria was found, he is not included in the study. A total of 3 members 
were identified as Turkish, which accounts for about 1.64% of the Nationalrat. This 
matches the percentage of Turks in the population, which means they have proportional 
representation. Voter turnout was 74.91% (IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Belgium 
Finding demographic information for Belgium was not easy.  All official statistics 
only identified the Flemish and Walloon population. Every other population was lumped 
together as “other,” which according to the CIA World Factbook, accounts for about 
11% of the population. Further research had to be conducted. One source, questionable 
in its reliability, hinted that there were Moroccan and Turkish minorities living in Belgium, 
so research was narrowed to finding their population.  Finally, one credible article from 
2011 cited that the Moroccan population was estimated to be about 300,000, and the 
Turkish population about 200,000 (Waters).  The World Bank claims that the Belgian 
population in 2011 was 11,047,744. This means that the Moroccan population is about 
2.72%, and the Turkish population is about 1.81%. There are 150 members in the 
Belgian Chambre des Représentants (House of Representatives). Members of Turkish 
origin were first investigated using newspaper articles about recent elections which 
named Turkish members or Turkish candidates (Batalla; Demir).  Names were then 
checked against the official list of current members ("Les Députés"). Then, as with 
Austria, members with names suggesting Muslim ethnicity were further researched for 
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foreign roots (“Qui”; Laaouej; Snoeys; Knack). In total, 7 members of Turkish origins 
were identified, as well as 5 members of Moroccan origin10. Turkish representation is 
more than proportional: they are 1.81% of the population, but 4.66% of the House of 
Representatives.  Moroccan representation is also more than proportional, with 2.72% 
of the population but 3.33% of the legislature. Voter turnout was 89.37% (IDEA Voter 
Turnout). 
 
Brazil 
Demographic information was obtained from CIA World Factbook: Brazil is 
47.7% white, 43.1% mulatto, 7.6% black, 1.1% Asian, and 0.4% indigenous.  Because 
the mulatto and white population are almost the same size, I labelled them both as 
majority groups. This makes the black, Asian, and indigenous the visible minority 
groups.  All Asian members of the Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) were 
identified via news articles and by searching through the member list on the official 
parliamentary website (“Conheça”) and then finding articles which identified them as 
Asian (Shiguti). The number of black members was found via an article published in 
Brazil’s Folha de S. Paulo six days after the most recent election (Magalhaes, et al.). 
The article said that, for the first time, candidates had to identify their skin color on the 
electoral register.  Thus, the numbers of black politicians in this study is based on the 
number of politicians who identify themselves as such, much like in a population 
census. This is an important distinction in Brazil, where race lines are not as clear-cut 
as in the U.S.  Some Brazilians will self-identify as “mulatto” or “moreno” if they are of 
mixed heritage - whereas in the U.S., they would typically be identified as black.  
                                                
10 One member was proved to have both Moroccan and Turkish heritage - he was counted once for each. 
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Furthermore, some people are identified differently by others than they are by 
themselves (Telles).  Before I found the Folha article, I was going through the 
Parliamentary website and aggregating a list of representatives whom different articles 
and websites had identified as black or of African descent.  I ended up with more 
representatives than mentioned in the article, probably because people were identifying 
these representatives on their own, without actual knowledge of the person’s 
background.  Thus, it made sense to use the number of self-identifying black members 
of parliament -  at least, if the politicians identified themselves as black, it means they 
feel some sort of connection to the community and feel that they represent them.  Using 
these sources, it was discovered that 0.97% of the Chamber of Deputies is Asian, while 
4.3% are black. This does not give either minority group representation proportional to 
their presence in the population (although the Asian population is just short). 
Furthermore, a newspaper article verified that there is in fact no representation for the 
indigenous community in the Federal Parliament (Gomes). Voter turnout was 80.60% 
(IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Denmark 
The CIA World Factbook names the ethnicities of different populations in 
Denmark, but did not provide percentages.  The populations it named were: 
Scandinavian, Inuit, Faroese, German, Turkish, Iranian, and Somali. These were used 
as the populations to focus on. All Danish population information was taken from the 
Statistics Denmark website. People who responded as Turkish, Iranian, or Somali 
immigrants or descendants were counted, and then their percentage out of the total 
population was calculated. This was also done for the Pakistani and Indian populations, 
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since they were found to have representatives in the government. The calculations 
show that Turkish people are 1.09% of the population, Pakistanis are 0.42%, Somalis 
are 0.35%, Iranis are 0.33%, and Indians are 0.16% of the population.  The Folketinget 
(Danish Parliament)  does not have reserved seats for visible ethnic minorities, but you 
only need to win 2% of the vote to be guaranteed a seat in parliament. Member profiles 
on the official Folketinget website include place of birth. By looking at this, two Turkish 
and one Indian member were identified (Folkentinget).  Other people who could be 
perceived as a visible minority by their appearance or name were further investigated. 
This resulted in finding one member of Pakistani background, and another member of 
Turkish Background (“Besøg”; Ritzau).  In total, the Turkish members make up 1.68% of 
the Parliament, exceeding their presence in the population. The one member each of 
Pakistani and Indian background also exceeds their respective minorities’ presence in 
the population.  There were no members of Iranian or Somali background. Voter turnout 
was 87.74% (IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Finland 
Demographic information was taken for the Roma people from CIA World 
Factbook, which took its estimates from 2006. However, because one Kenyan member 
of Parliament was found, it was necessary to look up the number of Kenyans living in 
Finland. This was found using the Statistics Finland website. The number of Kenyans 
and the total population used were from 2013 estimates. However, the website did not 
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have an option to tabulate data for Roma in 2013, so their data remains from 200611.  
Therefore, Roma are 0.1% of the population. According to the 2013 data, Kenyans are 
0.02% of the population. There is no representation for the Roma (Roman). There is 
one Kenyan member of Parliament (Talvitie), which is equal to 0.5% of the elected 
body.  Because there one representative for such a small minority group, it’s 
proportionality is more than twice as large as the proportionality of all the other 
countries.  If that one representative were removed from power, Finland’s proportionality 
would drastically drop.  It has been removed from the analysis. Voter turnout was 
67.37% (IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Greece 
There was very little demographic information available for Greece. However, one 
article talked about three Turkish candidates from the Thracian community that were 
elected to the the Hellenic Parliament in the last election (“Syriza’s”).  This is equal to 
1% of the Hellenic Parliament. Further research showed that most of the Turkish 
population living was living in Thrace. The US State Department issued some 
information in 2006 that estimated that the Muslim Population in Thrace was between 
0.89% and 1.28% of the total population (“Greece”). This has been used as the 
statistics for the Turkish population in Greece, since most Turkish people are Muslim 
and most Greeks are not. With three Turkish/Muslim members of Parliament, the 
minority may have achieved proportional representation.  It must be acknowledged that 
                                                
11 The Sami population in Finland could have been included, but they were left out 
because they have their own special parliament in Finland, with some devolved powers.  
This is a special situation that might have skewed results. 
21 
the data for Greece is simply not as reliable as the data for most of the other countries.   
The turnout rate for the last election was 63.87% (IDEA Voter Turnout).  
 
Netherlands 
Demographic information for the Netherlands was found using the Statistics 
Netherlands website. Dutch population was tabulated, as well as the non-dutch EU 
population. The minorities included in the study were those mentioned in CIA World 
Factbook’s demographic data for the Netherlands (which was from 2008) and then 
Afghanistan was added because an Afghan member of Parliament was found. The 
resulting demographics are: 78.64% Dutch, 5.76% is from other countries in the EU, 
2.35% is Turkish, 2.23% Moroccan, 2.21% Indonesian, 2.07% Surinamese, 0.% 
(former) Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, 0.26% Afghan, and 7.38% other.  Minority 
members of Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (House of Representatives) were 
found in a few ways. First of all, the biographies for each member on the official 
parliamentary website include place of birth. Three Turkish members and two Moroccan 
members of Parliament were identified simply by looking at every member’s place of 
birth (Netherlands Staten-Generaal). Second, it is easy to identify visible minorities in 
the Netherlands because the majority population has very similar characteristics.  
Therefore, the photos and names of the members of parliament were used to identify 
minority members. Their backgrounds were researched and proved by their own 
statements or by newspaper articles (Çegerek; DutchNews; Corner; Captein) . In total, 5 
Turkish members and 3 Moroccan members of Parliament were identified. 
Representing 3.3%and 2% of the parliament, respectively, both minorities reached 
proportional representation. There was also one member identified as having both 
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Caribbean and Surinamese heritage (Netherlands Parlemant, “Jadnanansing”); She 
was counted once for both, giving the Surinamese and Caribbean minority 0.67% of 
representation in the House. This is disproportionate to their presence in the population. 
One member of Afghan origin was found, equaling 0.67% of the parliament and 
exceeding proportional representation. Voter turnout was 74.56% (IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Slovakia 
Slovakia’s visible minority is the Romani people. Though perhaps less visible 
than minorities in other countries, the Romani still face the same disadvantages and 
prejudices that a visible population may face.  Roma make up 2% of the population, 
according to 2012 official estimates.  Because the website biographies for each member 
do not include information on ethnic background, information on Romani representation 
was obtained via an article published on the European Roma Rights Centre website 
(Hrustič). According to the article, there is only on Romani member of the Národná 
Rada, which is about 0.67% of the Council.  Thus, there is representation of Roma, but 
not proportional representation. Voter turnout was 59.11% (IDEA Voter Turnout). 
 
Analysis 
 The Proportionality for each visible minority in each country was calculated using 
the following formula12: 
 !"#$#"%&#'()&%*! = !%!!"! "#$%"&'!!"!!"#$%"&'()%!!"! "#$%"&'!!"!!"!#$%&'"!  
                                                
12 Used in the Shell article (2) 
23 
A minority group with no representation in the national government will have a 
proportionality of zero.  A minority group with perfect proportionality (percentage of 
minority in parliament equals percentage of minority in population) will have a 
proportionality of one.  The following graph represents each minority group by country, 
in order from highest proportionality to lowest proportionality13. 
  
                                                
13 The Turks of Greece are calculated using the upper limit of the percentage of the population. 
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The Kenyans of Finland have been left out of this graph.  The percentage of 
Kenyans in Finland is only 0.02% of the population, yet there is still one Kenyan 
member of the Eduskunta-Riksdagen.  This comes out to a proportionality of 25, which 
is seven times larger than the next-highest proportionality. Besides indicating a unique 
situation which should be considered carefully, it also makes the chart very difficult to 
read. 
As shown above, the proportionality of different minorities within a country can 
vary greatly, from more than proportional to no representation at all.  To get a sense of 
the overall visible minority of each country, proportionality was calculated using the 
following formula: 
 !"#$#"%&#'()&%*! = !%!!"!!""! "#$%"&"'(!!"!!"#$%"&'()%!!"!!""! "#$%"&"'(!!"!!"!#$%&'"(  
The chart below displays the calculation results. 
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From a first glance, it seems that Finland has achieved the highest proportionality, but, 
as mentioned above, the results for Finland should not be given much weight.  There 
are only two minority groups represented here: the Kenyans and the Roma.  The high 
proportionality of the Kenyan minority is brought down severely by the non-existent 
representation of the Roma minority.   If this one representative was not elected, 
Finland’s proportionality would drop to zero, which is likely more representative of the 
actual proportionality in Finland.  Because my research was limited to those minorities 
mentioned by the CIA World Factbook Data, several larger visible minority populations 
in Finland were left out of the study.  For example, there are 71,694 Asians and 35,410 
other Africans (excluding Kenyans) living in Finland, equal to 2.12% of the population 
(Statistics Finland). This would mean they would need about 4 representatives in 
Parliament for representation to be proportional, but none were found.  If they were 
included in the study, the proportionality for Finland would be much lower. Because of 
the misrepresentation of data and the huge disparity this has caused, Finland will not be 
included in further analyses in this paper. 
This graph seems to show some evidence that compulsory voting laws have a 
positive effect on visible minority representation. For starters - the country with the 
highest proportionality (excluding Finland) is Belgium, which has compulsory voting.  
The country with the lowest proportionality is Slovakia, which does not have compulsory 
voting.  However, a quick glance at the other countries seems to show that compulsory 
voting does not have a positive effect: only one country with compulsory voting 
achieved proportionality, compared with two countries that do not have compulsory 
voting.  
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It is also interesting to note that one of my expectations – that the stricter a 
country’s compulsory voting law, the better the visible minority representation – is 
incorrect. Yes, one of the stricter countries, Belgium, has the highest proportionality. 
Following this pattern, the next-strictest country, Brazil, should have had the next-
highest proportionality. I would have then expected Brazil to be followed by Australia, 
and then Greece.  Instead, Belgium is followed by Greece – whose compulsory voting 
law has no consequences.  Greece is followed by Brazil, and then Australia. Yes, the 
graph is book-ended by a country with strict mandatory voting laws and a country with 
more lax mandatory voting laws, but it is clear that how strictly the law is enforced is not 
a major influencer of visible minority representation.   
Perhaps the most influential component is that citizens be required to vote, even 
if the law is just for show.  Requiring citizens just to show up to the voting booth, without 
requiring them to actually vote (like in Australia), may not have as strong an effect. 
It is certainly interesting that Greece has achieved this level of representation 
through a proportional electoral system. Greece’s proportionality is based in part on the 
three Thracian Turks who were elected to the Hellenic Parliament. Most of the Turks in 
Greece live in Thrace.  As discussed before, recent literature on minority representation 
claims that a majoritarian system would be most beneficial for a minority concentrated in 
one constituency.  Yet, the Thracian Turks were still able to elect three representatives 
to Parliament under a proportional electoral system. With one more candidate, they 
would be just over represented. It would be interesting to do further research into how 
the election would have fared in a majoritarian system. Perhaps the type of electoral 
system is not as important as it is thought to be in electing minority representatives. 
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So far, my analysis seems to show mixed results on whether or not compulsory 
voting has a positive or negative effect on visible minority representation. It seems, by 
just glancing at the graph, that mandatory voting may in fact have a negative effect on 
visible minority representation. However, if you average the proportionality of all the 
countries with mandatory voting and compare it to the averaged proportionality of all the 
countries without mandatory voting, it becomes clear that, in general, compulsory voting 
laws do have a positive effect on the representation of visible minorities in national 
parliaments. This is seen in the graph below14. 
 
While this graph shows that compulsory voting laws have a positive effect on visible 
minority representation, the difference is small.  There are a lot more factors that could 
be affecting the results.  These are discussed further.  
 Perhaps the country of origin has an effect on voter participation or 
election. There are several reasons why this could be a factor.  Perhaps their former 
                                                
14 For the purposes of this graph, Finland was left out as well. The demographic information I calculated 
from the Australian Statistics Database was used for the calculation in this graph. However, even if the 
average was calculated using the demographic information printed by the website’s report, it would still be 
higher than the average proportionality of countries without mandatory voting. 
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country did not have a strong tradition of political involvement.  It could even be that 
there was a stigma attached to women voting, and the women still do not feel 
comfortable doing so in their new country and are passing down the stigma to their 
children. Whatever the reason, controlling for country of origin might bring about 
different results. Turkish immigrants are an interesting subset of this study because they 
were found in several of the countries included in this study.  Examining their 
representation separately would provide an extra control by allowing all the minority 
groups to have the same background. The following chart shows the proportionality of 
the Turkish minorities in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands: 
 
Belgium still ranks best, with 2.57 proportionality for Turks.  Austria and Greece remain 
the same because Turks are the only population being studied in those countries. 
Denmark has a higher proportionality for Turks than in general. The same goes for the 
Netherlands. When you average the proportionality of Turks in Belgium and Greece, 
you get 2.96. When you average the proportionality of Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Austria, you get 3.27.  So, in this case, proportionality is generally better in countries 
without compulsory voting laws.  It is possible that country of origin has some effect on 
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proportionality of representation of visible minorities. Further research should be 
pursued. 
Size of minority population could have been a contributing factor.  You’d expect 
that a larger minority group would mean more voting power, which in turn would mean 
more minority representatives. Three of the minorities that achieved no representation 
were under 0.5% of the population - the aboriginals in Brazil and the Somalis and 
Iranians in Denmark.   However, there were minority groups with much smaller shares 
of the population that were still able to get a spot in parliament, like the Kenyans in 
Finland. Furthermore, there are minorities with larger shares of the population that were 
not able to gain any representation, like the Dutch Indonesians, who are 2.21% of the 
population. Population size is therefore not likely to be one of the major explanations of 
variation of proportionality.  When the data is put into a scatterplot like the one below, it 
appears that there is a negative relationship between the size of the minority and the 
proportionality.  This is probably skewed by the fact that several smaller minorities were 
able to elect representatives.  The scatterplot is shown below. 
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Perhaps voter turnout rates are the cause of the variance.  I assumed the 
presence of compulsory voter laws would enhance visible minority representation 
because it would, in effect, force members of visible minorities to participate in 
elections. However, countries can have high voter turnout without compulsory voting 
laws.  This may explain why so many non-compulsory countries have high rates of 
minority representation. Analyzing proportionality by voter turnout comes up with some 
interesting results, as seen below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Belgium has the highest voter turnout (89.37%), which coincides with having the 
highest proportionality (excluding Finland).  Slovakia has the lowest voter turnout 
(59.11%) and also the lowest proportionality. It is interesting that Denmark has the 
second highest voter turnout (87.74%) out of all the countries in the study, despite not 
having compulsory voter laws.  Voter turnout might be the reason for Denmark’s high 
proportionality of 1.19.   
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Brazil’s has the third highest voter turnout, but only the sixth highest 
proportionality.  Brazil’s proportionality is brought down by its lack of aboriginal 
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. It would be interesting to conduct further 
research on the literacy rates of the indigenous people of Brazil to determine if the lack 
of representation might be due to the fact that illiterates are not required to vote. As 
expected, Belgium and Brazil have a higher turnout than Australia and Greece because 
they have stricter compulsory voting laws. Australia’s strict enforcement of requiring 
citizens to show up at the polls lends it to a higher voter turnout than Greece’s “just for show” 
compulsory voting law. It’s possible that Greece’s higher proportionality is due to the 
demographic information, which may not be the most accurate representation of Turks 
in Greece. The number of Turks in the country could be a lot higher, and therefore the 
proportionality might actually be smaller.  In the scatter plot below you will see that there 
is a positive relationship between voter turnout and proportionality in this study. 
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For this study, I chose to research visible minorities. I made the distinction 
between visible minorities and non-visible minorities, because visible minorities face 
more challenges in reaching political participation than non-visible minorities.  Karen 
Bird, a professor at McMaster University in Ontario, has extensively studied minority 
representation.  She chose to define visible minorities in a different way than I did:   
“...non-aboriginal persons who are non-Caucasian in race and non-European in 
origin. Such people may be recent immigrants, or their ancestors may have lived 
in the country in question for several generations. To simplify the study, I have 
excluded from this definition other ethnic groups (e.g., Jews, Eastern Europeans) 
whose contemporary visibility, as well as their history of exclusion and 
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discrimination, varies widely from country to country. Nor do I include territorial or 
linguistic minorities, or indigenous groups. In many cases, these latter groups 
have obtained some type of collective representational rights as part of a 
historical bargain to assure the viability of the state, and studying their political 
representation requires a different theoretical model than that presented here” 
(“Visible Minorities” 458).  
If I were to adhere to Bird’s definition by not including the minorities who might have a 
“historical bargain,” then aboriginals would be taken out of the Australian and Brazilian 
case. Blacks in Brazil would also be taken out of the analysis because the delineation 
between blacks and mulattos is complicated, and blacks have been in Brazil for a lot 
longer than Asians.  The Roma would also be excluded. The results of removing these 
minorities from the study are as follows: 
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Proportionality for Brazil and Australia is now only dependent on the representation of 
the Asian minorities in those two countries. Slovakia has been removed because the 
only minority being examined in the country is the Roma.  Belgium still has the best 
representation.  When you average the proportionality of countries with compulsory 
voting laws, you get 0.95.  When you average the proportionality of countries without 
compulsory voting laws, you get 0.97.  A small difference, but perhaps indicative that 
the details of the visible minority groups are important - such as the minority group’s 
political positioning or the length of time it has been present in the country. 
Overall, it seems that my hypothesis was correct.  Compulsory voting has a 
mostly positive effect on the representation of visible minorities.  This is evident in the 
higher average proportionality of countries with compulsory voting laws.  However, more 
research must be done. Minorities should be controlled for income - it is possible that 
this affects their representation, especially because running campaigns are expensive15.   
Countries need to provide more detailed demographic information in order to 
better study these topics.  Much of the relevant literature complains about there not 
being enough cross-country comparisons regarding the mechanisms of representation.  
I argue that, before that is done, there needs to be several in-depth analyses of 
countries, individually.  This can involve statistical analysis, but should also be 
combined with qualitative analysis.  Researchers could even conduct in-person 
interviews with immigrants and visible minorities in different countries to examine their 
voting habits and the reasons behind them.  The researcher should be familiar with the 
country and its language. Ideally, all these in-depth individual country examinations 
would occur within the same year, and then one group of researchers could aggregate 
                                                
15 Special thanks to Professor Einstein for this suggestion 
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all the information and conduct a cross-country comparison.  The number of countries 
will be large enough to have a statistically significant analysis.  In this way, a set of “best 
practices” can be determined for several different kinds of situations, and countries can 
implement these to make sure that the political voice of visible minorities are not 
suppressed. 
 
Works Cited 
 
Anzeige, Bezahlte. ""Mit Dem Kreuz in Der Schule Habe Ich Kein Problem"" ​Kleine 
Zeitung ​. Kleine Zeitung, 22 June 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.kleinezeitung.at/k/politik/4061751/Asdin­El­Habbassi_Mit­dem­Kreuz­in­der
­Schule­habe­ich­kein­Problem ​>. 
 
Australia. Parliament of New South Wales. ​The Argument for and against Dedicated 
Seats​. n.d. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/92013d59549d6769c
a257489001a5467/$file/chapt6.pdf​>.  
 
Australia Parliament. “Senator Lisa Singh.” ​Parliament of Australia ​. 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 
2015. 
<​http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=CDK​>. 
 
­­­. “Senator Nova Peris OAM.” ​Parliament of Australia ​. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=CDK​>. 
 
­­­."Senator Penny Wong." ​Parliament of Australia ​. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=250045#pers
onal ​>. 
 
­­­."Senator Zhenya Wang." ​Parliament of Australia ​. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=250045#pers
onal ​>. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. "Estimates and Projections, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians, 2001 to 2026." ​Australian Bureau of Statistics​. 30 Apr. 2014. 
Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/C19A0C6E4794A3FACA257CC90
0143A3D?opendocument​>.  
 
­­­."TableBuilder." ​Australian Bureau of Statistics​. n.d. Web. 
24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder?opendocument
&navpos=240 ​>.  
 
 
(Austria) Republik Österreich Parlament. "Wer Ist Wer: Nationalrat." ​Nationalrat​. Web. 
24 Apr. 2015. <​http://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/NR/​>. 
 
Batalla, Laura. "TURKS IN BELGIUM: CELEBRATING 50 YEARS OF MARRIAGE." 
Uluslararası Politika Akademisi ​. Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 23 May 2014. 
Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://politikaakademisi.org/turks­in­belgium­celebrating­50­years­of­marriage ​/>. 
 
Belgique Chambre Des Représentants. "Les Députés." ​La Chambre Des 
Représentants​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/depute&language=fr&cfm=/sit
e/wwwcfm/depute/cvlist.cfm ​>. 
 
"Besøg I Folketinget Sammen Med Den Høflige Hardliner." ​Merkonomernes 
Hovedorganisation ​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. <​http://www.mh.dk/p294.asp ​>. 
 
Bird, Karen. "The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies: 
A Comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada." ​Nationalism and Ethnic 
Politics​ 11.4 (2005): 425­65. ​Taylor & Francis Online ​. Taylor & Francis, 12 Jan. 
2012. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.web.pdx.edu/~mev/pdf/PS410_Readings_2014/Bird.pdf​>.  
 
­­­. ”The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established 
Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research.” Academy of Migration 
Studies in Denmark (AMID). 11 Nov. 2003. Aalborg University.  
 
Bloemraad, Irene, and Karen Schönwälder. Immigrant and Ethnic Minority 
Representation in Europe: Conceptual Challenges and Theoretical Approaches. 
2013. ​West European Politics​, 36:3. 564­579. Apr. 25 2015. 
<​http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.773724 ​>.  
 
Câmara Dos Deputados. "Conheça Os Deputados." ​Câmara Dos Deputados​. Web. 24 
Apr. 2015. <​http://www2.camara.leg.br/deputados/pesquisa ​>.  
 
Captein, Dennis. "Politieke Carrière Mohammed Mohandis in Stroomversnelling 
Gekomen." ​Myjour ​. 12 Apr. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​https://myjour.com/a/into­business/politieke­carrire­mohammed­mohandis­in­st 
oomversnelling­gekomen­3 ​>. 
 
Çegerek, Yasemin. “Maidenspeech Yasemin Cegerek.” PVDA. 23 Jan. 2014. 
<​http://www.pvda.nl/data/sitemanagement/media/2014/PvdA_maidenspeech_y​a 
semin_cegerek.pdf​>. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. "Ethnic Groups: Country Comparison to the World." ​Central 
Intelligence Agency​. n.d. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the­world­factbook/fields/2075.html ​>.  
 
Corner, Rachel. "Portfolio." ​Rachel Corner ​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.rachelcorner.nl/index.php#mi=2&pt=1&pi=10000&s=1&p=5&a=0&a ​t​=0 ​>. 
 
Demir, Zuhal. "Zuhal Demir." ​Nieuw­Vlaamse Alliantie (N­VA) ​. Nieuw­Vlaamse Alliantie 
(N­VA), 21 Jan. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.n­va.be/wie­is­wie/zuhal­demir ​>. 
 
DutchNews. "Labour Ousts Two Dutch Turkish MPs in Row over Integration Policy." 
DutchNews.nl ​. 14 Nov. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/11/labour­ousts­two­dutch­turkish ​­ ​mps­in
­row­over­integration­policy/​>. 
 
The Electoral Commission ​. Compulsory Voting Around the World. Rep. June 2006. 
Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0
020/16157/ECCompVotingfinal_22225­16484__E__N__S__W__.pdf​>.  
 
European Commission. "Explaining the Rules." ​EU Immigration Portal ​. 16 Aug. 2011. 
Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/who­does­what/more­information/explaining­the­rules­
why­are­there­eu­rules­and­national­rules_en ​>. 
 
­­­. ​Immigration in the EU ​. Digital image. ​Europa ​. 2014. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home­affairs/e­library/docs/infographics/immigration/migration­i
n­eu­infographic_en.pdf​>.  
 
Finland. Ministry of Justice. Operations and Administration. Finnish Election System. By 
Arto Jääskeläinen. Ministry of Justice, 17 Sept. 2010. Web. 8 May 2015. 
<​http://oikeusministerio.fi/material/attachments/om/julkaisut/6Fioq3rxv/OMTH_7_2010_
Finnish_Election_System__Overview_32_s.pdf​>. 
 
Folketinget. "Find a Member of the Danish Parliament." ​Folketinget​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Members.aspx​>. 
 
Frankal, Elliot. "Compulsory Voting around the World." ​The Guardian ​. N.p., 4 July 2005. 
Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/04/voterapathy.uk​>.  
 
Fung, Pamie. "Where Are Asian­Australians in Public Life?" ​The Age ​. The Age, 13 Oct. 
2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.theage.com.au/national/education/voice/where­are­asianaustralians­in­publ
ic­life­20141009­3hl3m.html ​>. 
 
Gomes, Karina. "Demandas Indígenas Perdem Espaço Na Política." ​Deutsche Welle ​. 
DW, 16 Oct. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.dw.de/demandas­indígenas­perdem­espaço­na­política/a­18000480 ​>. 
 
Hodgson, Martin. “Nova Peris is too Successful for Mainstream Australia, so she had to 
be torn down.” ​The Guardian ​. N.p., 31 Oct. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/31/nova­peris­is­too­successful­f
or­mainstream­australia­so­she­had­to­be­torn­down ​> 
 
Hrustič, Tomáš. "Roma Rights 2012: Challenges of Representation: Voice on Roma 
Politics, Power and Participation." ​European Roma Rights Center ​. 22 Aug. 2013. 
Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.errc.org/article/roma­rights­2012­challenges­of­representation­voice­on­rom
a­politics­power­and­participation/4174/4 ​>. 
 
International IDEA​. "Compulsory Voting." Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm ​>. 
 
­­­. "Voter Turnout." ​International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) ​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. <​http://www.idea.int/vt​/>. 
 
Knack Magazine. "Nadia Sminate En Meryame Kitir: ‘Wij Doen Niet Aan Politiek Omdat 
We Allochtonen Zijn’." ​Knack​. Roularta Media Group, 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 24 
Apr. 
2015. 
<​http://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/nadia­sminate­en­meryame­kitir­wij­doen­niet­aan­
politiek­omdat­we­allochtonen­zijn/article­normal­72402.html ​>. 
 
Laaouej, Ahmed. "À Mon Propos ­ Ahmed Laaouej." ​Ahmed Laaouej ​. 4 Dec. 2013. 
Web. 24 Apr. 2015. <​http://www.laaouej.be/a­mon­propos/​>. 
 
Magalhaes, Joao Carlos, Aguirre Talento, and Paula Reverbel. "Negros Autodeclarados 
São Só 20% Dos 513 Deputados Federais Eleitos." ​Folha De S.Paulo ​. 11 Oct. 
2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015.  
<​http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/10/1530993­negros­autodeclarados­sao­so­2
0­dos­513­deputados­federais­eleitos.shtml ​>. 
 
Netherlands Parlement. "Mr. T.M. (Tanja) ­ Hoofdinhoud." ​Parlement & 
Politiek​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.parlement.com/id/viem19ibk9z5/t_m_tanja_jadnanansing ​>. 
 
Netherlands Staten­Generaal.​ ​"Alle Leden." N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.staten­generaal.nl/alle_leden ​>.  
 
Netherlands Tweede Kamer Der Staten­Generaal. "Voting." ​Tweede Kamer Der 
Staten­Generaal: The Dutch House of Representatives​. n.d. Web. 08 May 2015. 
<​http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/voting­0 ​>. 
 
Norsk Amfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste. ​European Election Database ​. n.d. Web. 08 
May 2015. <​http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/index.html ​>. 
 
Pitkin, Hannah. ​The Concept of Representation ​. Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: 
University of California Press, 1967. Print. 
 
"Qui Suis­je?" ​Nawal Ben Hamou ​. 24 Sept. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://nawalbenhamou.be/bio/​>. 
 
Ritzau. "V­politiker Med Tyrkisk Baggrund: Politivold Må Stoppe." ​Information ​. 2 June 
2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. <​http://www.information.dk/telegram/462498 ​>. 
 
Roman, Raluca Bianca. "Finland." ​Romanis in Europe ​. University Association for 
Contemporary European Studies, 10 June 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.romanis.eu/?254 ​>. 
 
Santhanam, Laura. “22 Countries where Voting is Mandatory.” ​The Rundown ​. PBS 
Newshour. Nov. 3, 2014. Web. Apr. 24.2015. 
<​http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/22­countries­voting­mandatory/​> 
 
Shella, Kimberly. “Choosing between Representing Women or Representing Ethnic 
Groups in Europe? Adding and Subtracting Plurality, Representation, and 
Democracy.” Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting. April 2011. 
Chicago, Illinois.  
<​http://ssrn.com/abstract=2096219 ​>. 
 
Shiguti, Aldo. "POLÍTICA: Deputados Nikkeis 'reinstalam' Atividades Do Grupo 
Parlamentar." ​Jornal Nippak​. 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.portalnikkei.com.br/politica­deputados­nikkeis­reinstalam­atividades­do­gru
po­parlamentar/​>. 
 
Snoeys, Astrid. "Ecolo­senator Khattabi Noemt Nikab "onbegrijpelijk"" ​HLN ​. 8 June 
2012. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/1275/Islam/article/detail/1450767/2012/06/08/Ecolo­senator­K
hattabi­noemt­nikab­onbegrijpelijk.dhtml ​>. 
 
Statistics Denmark, "FOLK1: Population at the First Day of the Quarter by Municipality, 
Sex, Age, Marital Status, Ancestry, Country of Origin and Citizenship." ​Statbank 
Denmark​. n.d. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/define.asp?MainTable=FOLK1&PLa
nguage=1&Tabstrip=&PXSId=0&SessID=155174800&FF=20&grouping3=20063915132
215154453&tfrequency=4 ​>. 
 
Statistics Finland. "Origin, Background Country and Language by Age and Sex 1990 ­ 
2013, Whole Country." ​Statistics Finland ​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://193.166.171.75/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=047_vaerak_tau_202_en&ti=Origin, 
background country and language by age and sex 1990 ­ 2013, whole 
country&path=../Database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/&lang=1&multilang=en ​>. 
 
Statistics Netherlands. "Population; Sex, Age, Origin and Generation, 1 January." ​CBS 
Statistics Netherlands​. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLEN&PA=37325eng&D1=a&D2=0&D3
=0&D4=0&D5=0,139,231&D6=l&LA=EN&HDR=T&STB=G1,G3,G5,G2,G4&VW=T​>.  
 
Stoychev, Stoycho. "Types of Ethnic Minority Representation in Central And Eastern 
Europe." ​CEU Political Science Journal ​ 5 (2006): 5­31. Central and Eastern 
European Online Library (C.E.E.O.L.). Web. 1 Apr. 2015. 
“Syriza’s election triumph raises expectations among Turkish minority in 
Greece.” Today’s Zaman. 26 Jan. 2015. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://www.todayszaman.com/mobile_detailHeadline.action?newsId=370885 ​>. 
 
Talvitie, Liisa. "Jani Toivola Palaa Isänä Töihin." ​APU ​. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 24 Apr. 
2015. ​<​http://www.apu.fi/artikkeli/jani­toivola­palaa­isana­toihin ​>. 
 
Telles, Edward Eric. "Racial Classification." ​Race in Another America: The Significance 
of Skin Color in Brazil ​. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004. Print. 
 
United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor."Greece: International 
Religious Freedom Report 2006." ​U.S. Department of State ​. 1 Jan. 2006. Web. 
24 Apr. 2015. <​http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71383.htm ​>. 
 
United States Embassy. Athens. ​Greek Citizenship Code ​. U.S. Embassy, n.d. Web. 24 
Apr. 2015. 
<​http://athens.usembassy.gov/uploads/7z/Z4/7zZ4A6EyE4dMjph5dNxFew/citiz​e ​nship_c
ode.pdf​>.  
 
Wauters, Bram, and Floor Eelbode. "Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in 
Belgium: From Enfranchisement to Ethnic Vote." ​Heimatkunde  
Migrationspolitisches Portal ​. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 1 Sept. 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 
2015. 
<​http://heimatkunde.boell.de/2011/09/18/political­participation­ethnic­minorities­belgium­
enfranchisement­ethnic­vote ​>. 
 
World Bank Group. "Population, Total." ​World Bank​. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. 
<​http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL ​>. 
 
 
Thanks to Professor Wilson, Professor Einstein, Megan Winderbaum, David Weinstein, 
B.K. Carter, and Jonatas. 
Thanks to my family and friends. 
Special thanks to Professor Katherine Krimmel. 
 
